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The Muddled State: California's Application
of Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence in
People v. Dungo and People v. Lopez
by MARK K. HANASONO*
Introduction
John Willey never met Virginia Hernandez Lopez. He never saw
her drink any alcohol. He never analyzed her blood sample, despite
his profession as a blood alcohol analyst. However, Willey sealed the
fate of Virginia Hernandez Lopez. He told a jury at Hernandez
Lopez's criminal trial that someone else had measured her blood
alcohol concentration ("BAC") at 0.09 percent, two hours after she
was involved in a traffic collision that killed another motorist.
Similarly, Robert Lawrence was not present to hear Lucinda
Correia Pina tell her ex-boyfriend, Reynaldo Santos Dungo, "I'll fuck
whoever I want ... I will do whatever I want." Lawrence did not see
Dungo grab Pina's arm, nor did he see Pina respond by punching
Dungo on the chin and biting his arm. Lawrence did not hear Pina
declare, "You're not even a good father. You're a lousy fucking
father ... you're a worthless piece of shit." Lawrence did not see
Dungo snap. He did not see Dungo strangle Pina, as he told her, "I'm
a good dad. I'm a good dad. I'm not a bad father. Fuck you."
Despite his profession as a pathologist, Lawrence did not even
perform Pina's autopsy. But Lawrence did tell a jury about an
autopsy report which was prepared by another doctor named George
Bolduc. The jury never heard how Bolduc was fired from his prior
position as a coroner in one county, and resigned "under a cloud" in
another county. The jury never heard how Bolduc's reputation led
media to assert his incompetence, and prosecutors to refuse to use
him as an expert witness in homicide cases. Based only on his review
of Bolduc's report, Lawrence did tell the jury that Pina was
* Attorney, Office of the Los Angeles County Alternate Public Defender. J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1999; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1996.
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apparently strangled for more than two minutes. This conclusion
enabled the prosecutor to argue that this length of time negated
Dungo's claim of acting in the heat of passion or during a sudden
quarrel.
Juries convicted both Hernandez Lopez and Dungo based on the
testimony of witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the actual
analyses performed on forensic evidence that incriminated them in
their respective cases. Both of their cases were appealed to the
California Supreme Court. Respectively, People v. Lopez' and
People v. Dungo2 involved the constitutionality of admitting a
prosecution witness's testimony regarding analysis of forensic
evidence contained in a report which someone else prepared. The
defense in both cases challenged the testimony on Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause grounds, citing Crawford v. Washington' and its
progeny. The California Supreme Court found that the testimony
about the reports on forensic evidence neither implicated the Sixth
Amendment's right to confrontation, nor required that either
defendant confront the actual preparer of the report.
The analysis of forensic evidence is complex and requires
explanation by witnesses with specialized knowledge. This article
explores the concerns raised by the introduction of testimony by
witnesses who did not participate in the original analysis of the
evidence at issue. This article reviews United States Supreme Court
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as applied to forensic evidence
analysis, including its most recent case of Williams v. Illinois. This
article critiques the California Supreme Court's most recent decisions
in Lopez and Dungo for their interpretation of Williams, and their
departure from the guidelines set forth by Crawford and its progeny.
Specifically, in determining the type of statement that should
constitutionally require confrontation of its declarant, the court
narrowly focused on the statement's formalized presentation. This
approach overemphasizes the significance of the statement's form
over its production and substance. Consequently, this overemphasis
on formality detracts from the more significant consideration of
whether the statement's primary purpose is for criminal prosecution.
1. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469 (Cal. 2012).
2. See People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 (Cal. 2012).
3. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
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I. Crawford and Its Progeny
Crawford v. Washington is arguably the most important
constitutional criminal procedure case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the past decade. Crawford did not construct a mere
evidentiary rule limiting the admissibility of certain types of hearsay.
Rather, it breathed new life into the Confrontation Clause and its
protection against governmental abuse of criminal defendants.' It
generated dozens of articles by scholars and practitioners. Finally, it
created challenges for trial courts to consider for the admissibility of a
variety of statements.
When interpreting the Confrontation Clause, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Crawford declared that the accused is guaranteed the right
to confront any "witness against" him.' The Confrontation Clause,
thus, demands that the prosecution must present its witnesses in open
court, under oath, and make them available for cross-examination.
The Court evaluated the historical applications of the Confrontation
Clause and determined that it was aimed at protecting against the
prosecution's ex parte examinations introduced as evidence against
the accused.! Thus, the Confrontation Clause protects against the
introduction of out-of-court statements by certain witnesses.
The Court defined a witness against the accused as someone who
"bears testimony" against him.8 To determine whether a statement
may be introduced against the accused at trial, the Court focused on
whether the declarant of the statement was acting as a witness who
bears testimony.9 According to the Court, such statements would
violate the Confrontation Clause if offered against the accused at trial
without prior confrontation. 0 Thus, the prosecution must not use
statements that bear testimony, or the "testimonial statements" of a
witness who is unavailable to appear at trial, unless the defendant had
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.'
The witness at issue in Crawford was Sylvia Crawford, who told
the police that her husband, Michael Crawford, stabbed a man who
had allegedly attempted to rape her. Both Sylvia and Michael were
taken into custody and interrogated by the police. Sylvia's statement
5. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (2004).
7. Id. at 50.
8. See id. at 51.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 54.
11. See id.
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to the police rebutted Michael's statement that he acted in self
defense against the victim. Specifically, Sylvia stated that she did not
see any weapon in the victim's hand during his altercation with
Michael. At trial, Sylvia claimed spousal privilege to avoid testifying
as a prosecution witness against Michael. The trial court deemed
Sylvia legally unavailable to testify, but allowed the prosecution to
introduce her recorded statement to the police. The defense never
had the opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia. Accordingly, the
defense challenged the introduction of Sylvia's recorded statement as
a testimonial statement that violated the Confrontation Clause.
In determining the admissibility of Sylvia's statement, the Court
in Crawford offered three definitions of what constitutes a testimonial
statement, although it declined to select any one of them as the
standard.12 The first definition of a testimonial statement is "ex parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.""
The second definition includes "extrajudicial statements ...
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 4 The third definition
includes statements that were "made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial."15
The Court found Sylvia's statements at issue in the case
"testimonial" under all three definitions. 16 Subsequently, lower courts
have observed that the third definition is the broadest of the three."
Generally speaking, many informal statements or statements made
without an oath, or not during a deposition or interrogation, may still
lead an objective observer to reasonably expect the statements'
availability for use at a later trial.
The definition and scope of "testimonial," for the determination
of the admissibility of statements, has created some controversy and
12. See id. at 51-52.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 52.
16. See id. at 61.
17. See Dylan 0. Keenan, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the Lower Courts,
122 YALE L.J. 782, 828 (2012) (citing United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 500 n.11 (6th
Cir. 2005); State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458, 466 (Mont. 2006)).
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the need for clarification by subsequent cases. Two years after
Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the definition of
"testimonial" in Davis v. Washington and its companion case of
Hammon v. Indiana.' In these cases, the Court introduced a fourth
definition of "testimonial" with its inquiry into the primary purpose
behind the statement when it was made.19 Specifically, the Court
declared, "[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency."20  The Court conversely saw
statements as testimonial "when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."'
Since Crawford, the Supreme Court began to review applications
of the Confrontation Clause in the context of forensic scientific
evidence. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the police arrested and
seized white powder from a K-Mart employee named Sergio
Melendez-Diaz.22 A government laboratory analyst tested the white
powder and determined that it was cocaine. One week after the
testing, the analyst recounted the test results in certificates of analysis.
The certificates were sworn before a notary public.
Following Crawford's requirement for cross-examination of
declarants who make testimonial statements, the Supreme Court held
that the content of lab report affidavits was effectively a "witness
against" the defendant, and that the defendant deserved
Confrontation Clause protection.23 The Court held that crime lab
affidavits were testimonial, as they fell within the "core class of
testimonial statements" implicated in Crawford.24  Affidavits were
mentioned twice in that list of core testimonial statements.25  The
affidavits in Melendez-Diaz included facts sworn by the analyst, and
were designed to replace his live testimony.2 The circumstances




22. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307-308 (2009).
23. See id. at 322-23.
24. See id. at 310.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 310-311.
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surrounding the certificates would lead an objective observer to
believe they would be available for use at a later trial, and served no
other purpose than to prove a fact at trial. The affidavits even
contained language that made them prima facie evidence of the
composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance.27
Moreover, use at trial was the affidavits' sole purpose under
Massachusetts law.
The Supreme Court took its holding in Melendez-Diaz one step
further with the case of Bullcoming v. New Mexico."9 There, the
Court reviewed whether a surrogate witness could testify in place of
the analyst who actually performed the particular forensic test at
issue.30 The state of New Mexico prosecuted Donald Bullcoming for
aggravated driving while intoxicated, after rear-ending a pickup truck
at an intersection in Farmington, New Mexico. After the collision,
Bullcoming refused to take a breathalyzer test. A blood sample was
drawn from Bullcoming at a local hospital. The sample was then sent
to the New Mexico Department of Health's Scientific Laboratory
Division.
A report was generated on a standard form identifying the
participants in the testing. The report contained information
provided by the arresting police officer, including the reason for
stopping the suspect, and the date and time when the blood was
drawn.31 The report also included certifications by the nurse who
drew the blood, and the intake employee who sent the blood to the
laboratory. The original analyst, Curtis Caylor, determined that
Bullcoming's blood alcohol level was 0.21 grams per hundred
milliliters. Caylor recorded this finding, his observation that the seal
of the sample was received intact, and that he followed the
procedures written on the back of the report. Another examiner
reviewed Caylor's analysis and certified that he was qualified to
conduct the test and that he followed the established procedure.3 2
During trial, the prosecution announced that it would not call
Caylor to testify because he had been recently placed on unpaid
leave. The prosecutor instead called another analyst named
Gerasimos Razatos. The prosecutor introduced Caylor's finding as a
27. See id. at 311.
28. See id.
29. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
30. See id. at 2710.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2711.
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business record through Razatos, who had neither observed nor
reviewed the original analysis. Razatos was a surrogate for the
original analyst who did not testify at trial.3 ' He merely read in the
results contained in the original analyst's report.
The Court treated the case as a simple application of Crawford
and Melendez-Diaz, holding that the surrogate testimony violated the
Confrontation Clause.' The contents of the report were testimonial
hearsay. The Court found that the original work and documentation
by Caylor related to past events and human actions, which were
"meet [sic] for cross-examination."3 Caylor tested the evidence and
prepared a certificate concerning his analysis. His report resembled
those in Melendez-Diaz: a police officer provided seized evidence to a
government laboratory, where an analyst tested it and prepared a
certificate concerning the result of his analysis.36 The Court stated
that such "[a] document created solely for an 'evidentiary
purpose,' . .. made in aid of police investigation, ranks as
testimonial. "
In its most recent application of the Confrontation Clause to
forensic reports, the Court reviewed the case of Williams v. Illinois,
which involved the testimony of an expert witness who gave an
opinion based on a laboratory report that he did not personally
author." Sandy Williams was prosecuted for the aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery of a woman
in Chicago. After the incident, the victim went to a hospital where
doctors took a blood sample and vaginal swabs for a sexual assault
kit. A police detective collected the kit and sent it to the Illinois State
Police lab. A scientist at the Illinois State Police lab named Brian
Hapack received the kit, and conducted a test that confirmed the
presence of semen on the vaginal swabs. For purposes of DNA
testing, the lab sent the vaginal swabs to Cellmark Diagnostics
Laboratory in Germantown, Maryland. Cellmark sent a report which
contained a male DNA profile produced from the semen found in the
swabs. A forensic specialist at the Illinois State Police lab named
Sandra Lambatos conducted a computer search to see if the Cellmark
33. See id. at 2714 (noting that the prosecution never asserted that the analyst who
signed the certification was unavailable).
34. See id. at 2717.
35. See id. at 2714.
36. See id. at 2717.
37. See id.
38. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012).
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profile matched any entries in the state's database. The computer
showed that it matched Williams' sample, which was previously taken
by an analyst named Karen Abbinanti from an unrelated arrest.39
At trial, Hapack and Abbinanti testified. The prosecution also
called Lambatos to testify as an expert witness about the general
process of generating DNA profiles from forensic samples including
blood and semen. She testified that in comparing two DNA profiles,
it is common in the scientific community for one expert to rely on the
records of another expert. Lambatos further testified that Cellmark
was an accredited crime lab to which her lab routinely sent samples
for DNA testing in order to expedite the testing process and to
reduce its backlog. Lambatos testified that to keep track of evidence
samples and preserve the chain of custody, analysts relied on
regularly accepted protocols, including sealed shipping containers and
labeled shipping manifests. The shipping manifests for sending the
victim's vaginal swabs between the state lab to Cellmark were
admitted as business records.
The prosecutor asked Lambatos if she compared the DNA found
in semen that Brian Hapack identified from the victim's vaginal swabs
to the male DNA profile from which Karen Abbinanti identified
Williams' blood. Lambatos testified that based on her comparison of
the two profiles, she concluded that Williams could not be excluded
as a source of semen in the vaginal swabs. She further testified that
the probability of the profile's appearing in the general population
was 1 in 8.7 quadrillion black men, 1 in 390 quadrillion white men, or
1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic men. She ultimately concluded that the
sample "matched" Williams' DNA."
Lambatos did not conduct or observe any of the testing of the
vaginal swabs. Her testimony relied on the DNA profile produced by
Cellmark. She had not seen any of the work Cellmark did to identify
the male DNA profile in the vaginal swabs. Lambatos acknowledged
that the DNA sample might have degraded before Cellmark analyzed
it. However, the state lab would have probably noticed degradation
before sending it to Cellmark. Additionally, the visual representation
of the DNA sequence did not appear to exhibit any patterns of
degradation in the profile that Cellmark produced.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito authored a plurality
opinion, joined by three other members of the Court: Chief Justice
John Roberts, and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer.
39. Id. at 2230.
40. Id.
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The plurality opinion found that the testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because the expert's statements were not
offered to prove the truth of the report's contents.4' Specifically,
Justice Alito determined that the expert referred to the report only to
establish that it contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA
profile deduced from Williams' blood. According to Justice Alito,
Lambatos did not testify that it contained an accurate profile of the
perpetrator's DNA. 42 In other words, Justice Alito stated that the
report was not to be considered for its truth, but only for the purpose
of seeing whether it matched something else.
Justice Alito further stated that even if the Cellmark report had
been introduced for its truth, it would not have violated the
Confrontation Clause. Justice Alito declared that statements which
violate the Confrontation Clause share two characteristics: (1) they
have the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of
engaging in criminal conduct, and (2) they involve formalized
statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.43 According to Justice Alito, the Cellmark report was not
prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual."
The primary purpose was not to specifically accuse Williams, or to
create evidence for use at trial. Justice Alito stated that its primary
purpose was "to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large," not
for use as evidence against Williams, who was neither in custody nor
under suspicion at that time.45 He reasoned that no one at Cellmark
could have known that the profile would inculpate Williams, or
anyone else whose profile was in the Illinois database. Justice Alito
believed that there was no "prospect of fabrication" under such
circumstances and "no incentive to produce anything other than a
scientifically sound and reliable profile."" As such, according to
Justice Alito, the report bore little resemblance to "the historical
practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate." 47
The Court did not produce a majority opinion in Williams.
Justices Elena Kagan, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Sonia Sotomayor dissented. In his separate opinion, Justice Clarence
41. See id. at 2228.
42. See id. at 2240.
43. See id. at 2242.
44. See id. at 2243.
45. See id. at 2243.
46. See id. at 2244.
47. See id.
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Thomas concurred only in judgment with the plurality. He ultimately
agreed that disclosure of the Cellmark report through Lambatos did
not violate the Confrontation Clause." However, Justice Thomas
disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that statements introduced
to explain an expert's opinion are introduced for a non-hearsay
purpose.49 Disclosing an out-of-court statement for the factfinder to
evaluate an expert's opinion presents the same effect as disclosing it
for its truth: the factfinder must still determine whether the
information is true.o The validity of Lambatos' opinion turned on the
truth of the statements contained in the Cellmark report. Specifically,
the statements regarding the DNA profile being characteristic of a
male donor and being found in semen from vaginal swabs were
introduced for their truth.
Justice Breyer also wrote a separate opinion, even though he
agreed with the plurality's decision that the trial court should allow
Lambatos to rely on the Cellmark report as evidence to ground her
expert opinion." Justice Breyer concurred primarily for practicality.
Unlike the plurality, he understands the legitimate need in calling the
original author of the report.52 Without that original author, an
expert may inappropriately slip in hearsay evidence under the guise
of her reliance on it while forming her expert opinion. Justice Breyer
agrees with Justice Thomas in this regard. However, Justice Breyer
seeks to avoid the inefficient practice of calling every single person
who was potentially involved in the production of the report.5 3
Because both the dissent and the plurality failed to present any
alternative, Justice Breyer promotes the traditional yet "artificial"
practice of allowing experts to introduce inadmissible basis evidence.54
48. See id. at 2254. Justice Thomas took the position that the Cellmark statements
were not testimonial solely because they lacked the characteristic of "formality and
solemnity," which he believed was required under Crawford. As discussed below, Justice
Thomas further disagreed with the plurality's newly created formulation of the primary
purpose test, which required the statement to have the primary purpose of accusing a
"targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct." See id. at 2262.
49. See id. at 2257.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 2246.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 2246-47. Justice Breyer would prefer to follow the dissent in Melendez-
Diaz, which promoted accepting the introduction of scientific analysis without testimony
from the analyst who originally produced it. See id. at 2245; Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
54. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2246 (2012). Justice Breyer urged to set
the case for reargument because he did not believe the plurality nor the dissent adequately
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Ultimately, the plurality opinion does not express the holding of
Williams. Justice Alito's opinion captured the agreement of the
necessary five justices only with respect to the case disposition. Five
Justices reject every other aspect of Justice Alito's opinion." Justice
Thomas' concurrence is not the narrowest ground on which the
Williams decision rests. It cannot be regarded as narrower than the
plurality opinion because it is not a subset of it." Justice Kagan's
dissent is "only labeled a 'dissent' by convention."" The Supreme
Court has previously declared, "when a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds.""' Consequently, Williams is an example of a
decision where the only binding aspect is its specific result.59
As this article discusses, the variety of views expressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court leaves state courts, such as California's Supreme
Court, with little structured guidance as to the evaluation of out-of-
court statements sought to be introduced by the prosecution in
criminal trials.
II. California's Post-Williams Cases: People v. Lopez and
People v. Dungo
A. People v. Lopez
The California Supreme Court faced the admissibility of forensic
reports through surrogate testimony in People v. Lopez. In Lopez,
Virginia Hernandez Lopez drove a sport utility vehicle that collided
with a pickup truck. The collision resulted in the pickup truck
driver's death. Witnesses testified that while working at a restaurant
in Julian, San Diego County, Hernandez Lopez consumed a single
shot of tequila at 8:30 p.m., and two shots between 9:45 p.m. and 10:15
p.m. She left work shortly before 11:00 p.m. The traffic collision
addressed how the Confrontation Clause applies to forensic reports and the underlying
technical statements written by laboratory technicians. See id. at 2244-45 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
55. See id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 485 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
59 See id at 483.
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occurred during her drive from work. At 1:04 a.m., two vials of blood
were drawn from Hernandez Lopez for testing.
The prosecution alleged that Hernandez Lopez committed the
offense of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. During the jury
trial, San Diego County Sheriff's Regional Crime Laboratory
criminalist, John Willey, testified that he had reviewed a report
prepared by his colleague, Jorge Pefia. Although he supposedly
analyzed Hernandez Lopez's blood sample, Pefia did not testify at
trial. As described in Pefia's report, Willey testified that Pefia used a
gas chromatograph to analyze the blood sample. Willey further
testified that the report indicated that Hernandez Lopez's blood
sample contained a blood alcohol content of 0.09 percent. Moreover,
Pefia's report was admitted into evidence.
Willey had been employed by the laboratory for over seventeen
years, and knew its "procedures for processing blood samples for
alcohol analysis."" He had trained Pefia, and was "intimately
familiar" with his procedures and how he tests blood for alcohol.
According to Willey, "each of the people who work at the lab is
trained to process blood alcohol analysis in the same manner.""
Willey added that based on his own "separate abilities as a criminal
analyst," his conclusion was also that the BAC was 0.09 percent.6
Based on the 0.09 percent figure, a toxicologist named John
Treuting testified about the expected BAC of a person at the time of
a traffic collision. Treuting extrapolated that a person who had a
BAC of 0.09 percent two hours after that traffic collision would have
had a BAC of 0.12 percent at the time of driving. Treuting further
determined that it was impossible for the person to have a
significantly lower BAC, based on a drinking pattern provided by Ms.
Hernandez Lopez and the restaurant bartender."
Ms. Hernandez Lopez testified that she had two shots of tequila
at the end of her work shift at the restaurant. A coworker, Jorge
Acosta, corroborated the account provided by Hernandez Lopez. As
she drove about fifty to fifty-five miles per hour, an oncoming car,
with its highbeams illuminated, drove toward her in her lane.
Hernandez Lopez became scared and steered to her right. Steering to
the right was the last event that she could remember. Dr. Ian
McIntyre of the San Diego County Medical Examiner's forensic
60. See id. at 471-72.





toxicology laboratory testified that the driver of the other car was
intoxicated with a BAC of 0.11 percent.'
The jury convicted Ms. Hernandez Lopez of vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated." The Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. The California Supreme
Court granted review, and transferred the case back to the court of
appeal for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz. On
reconsideration, the court of appeal reversed the judgment of
conviction, holding that admitting Pefia's report into evidence and
permitting Willey to testify about its contents violated Ms. Hernandez
Lopez's right to confront Pefia at trial.'
Upon reviewing Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and
Williams, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that the U.S.
Supreme Court has not agreed on a definition of "testimonial" for
Crawford purposes. However, with each case, the California
Supreme Court focused on the U.S. Supreme Court's search for
formality in the suspects' statements. The California Supreme Court
summarized the reasons given in Melendez-Diaz for finding
laboratory certificates testimonial and thus triggering Crawford. The
California Supreme Court noted that:
each certificate was (1) a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact, (2) functionally identical to live, in-
court testimony, (3) made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that [it] would be available for use at a later trial, and
(4) created to provide 'prima facie evidence of the
composition, quality, and the net weight' of the
substance found in the plastic bags seized. .. .. "
The California Supreme Court then reviewed Bullcoming,
pointing out the formal character of the analyst's certificate in that
particular case. According to the California Supreme Court, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Bullcoming found the certificate was formalized in
a signed document, which referred to state court rules that provide
64. See id. at 473.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 474 (citations omitted).
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"for the admission of certified blood alcohol analyses."" The Court
in Bullcoming found these formalities "more than adequate" to
qualify the report as testimonial in nature.69
With its review of Williams, the California Supreme Court
echoed the plurality's decision to find a surrogate analyst's testimony
non-testimonial because it was admitted to explain the basis of her
independent conclusion.70 The California Supreme Court also
pointed out that the plurality opinion in Williams decided that the
primary purpose of the report was to find a dangerous rapist who was
still at large, as opposed to accusing a specific targeted individual.
The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court plurality found this was
insufficient to trigger Confrontation Clause protection."
From its interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court cases, the
California Supreme Court in Lopez decided that the presence of two
critical components make a statement "testimonial." First, courts
should evaluate whether a statement was made with some degree of
formality or solemnity. The court cited language from Crawford ("a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony"),
Melendez-Diaz ("a solemn declaration or affirmation"), Bullcoming
("formalized in a signed document"), and Davis v. Washington
("formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance").72 Second,
courts should consider whether the statement's primary purpose
relates to a criminal prosecution.
On the facts in Lopez, the court did not reach the primary
purpose issue. The court found that Pefia's report was not made with
the required formality or solemnity to be considered testimonial.74
The court characterized each of the report's six pages. The second
page of the report was a printout of a gas chromatography machine's
calibrations on the day of the test. Pefia's signature appears on this
page, and his initials appear on the remaining pages. Pages three and
six were the quality control runs before and after the subject samples.
Pages four and five showed two computer-generated numerical
68. Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
69. Id. (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2011)).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 475-76.
72. See id. at 477 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct.
2705, 2717 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006)).
73. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 477 (Cal. 2012).
74. See id. at 479.
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results (0.0906 and 0.0908) of two laboratory analyses of Hernandez
Lopez's sample. The court determined that pages two through six
consisted entirely of data generated by a machine. The court found
that machine printouts do not violate the Confrontation Clause."
In the court's view, the first page of the report was the only page
to present any Confrontation Clause issue. The first page contained a
chain of custody log sheet showing the results of nine blood samples
Pefia tested on August 31, 2007. One of the blood samples belonged
to Hernandez Lopez. The page contained handwritten information
including the booking number, lab number, subject's name, arresting
officer's name, and whether the sample was sealed, for each of the
nine people who produced samples. The surrogate witness, Willey,
testified that an assistant named Brian Constantino wrote this
information. Constantino specifically wrote down Hernandez
Lopez's name, laboratory number, date and time of collection, and
date and time of receipt by the laboratory. Pefia's initials appear in a
box marked, "Analyzed by." The chart also includes the date on
which the blood was analyzed and the results of the blood test as
"0.09," indicating that Hernandez Lopez's sample tested at 0.09
percent BAC. In this chart, Pefia wrote this information about
Hernandez Lopez's BAC based on the content contained on the
report's first page. Specifically, he relied on Constantino's
designation of Hernandez Lopez's sample and the machine generated
results for that particular sample. Constantino's written notes linking
Hernandez Lopez's name to the particular blood sample was
admitted for its truth."
The California Supreme Court found that Constantino's written
notation did not meet the requisite level of formality or solemnity to
be considered "testimonial" hearsay." The court faulted the page for
including neither Constantino's nor Pefia's signature, certification, or
swearing to the truth of the contents. The court distinguished Pefia's
report from the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, which were sworn
before a notary by the testing analysts who had prepared them. The
court also highlighted the certificate in Bullcoming as formalized in a
signed document that expressly referred to court rules for
admissibility. The court characterized the written notation in Pefia's
report as "nothing more than an informal record of data for internal
75. Id. at 478.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009)).
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purposes, as is indicated by the small printed statement near the top
of the chart: 'FOR LAB USE ONLY."" In the court's view, this
particular notation was not prepared with the formality required for
testimonial statements.
B. People v. Dungo
In People v. Dungo, a companion case to Lopez, the California
Supreme Court considered the testimony of the employer of a non-
testifying pathologist." The pathologist's opinion was crucial to
disprove the defense's theory that Reynaldo Dungo acted in the heat
of passion or in a sudden quarrel when he killed his ex-girlfriend,
Lucinda Correia Pina.
After about a year in a romantic relationship, Dungo began
exhibiting jealousy and hostility toward Pina. One night, Pina
disappeared. Dungo was arrested and admitted to killing Pina. He
told the police that they argued, and she punched him, pushed him,
and threw children's toys at him. He ultimately grabbed her by the
throat and strangled her.
Before trial, the prosecution announced it would not call George
Bolduc, the pathologist who performed Pina's autopsy. Bolduc's
employer, Robert Lawrence, testified in a pretrial evidentiary hearing
that Bolduc had been fired from his previous job as a Kern County
coroner and resigned "under a cloud" from his position in Orange
County. Lawrence referred to newspaper articles asserting that
Bolduc was incompetent. Lawrence further indicated that
prosecutors in several counties refuse to use Bolduc as a witness.
However, Lawrence dismissed the criticisms, and testified that he had
never personally seen any evidence that Bolduc did anything
incompetent.
During trial, Lawrence did not testify about Bolduc's opinion.
Rather, Lawrence testified that he reviewed Bolduc's autopsy report
and accompanying photographs. Based on these materials and his
independent opinion as a forensic pathologist, Lawrence concluded
that Pina died from asphyxia caused by strangulation. Lawrence
concluded "that Pina had 'hemorrhages in the neck organs consistent
with fingertips during strangulation' and that she had 'pinpoint
hemorrhages in her eyes,' indicating a lack of oxygen." Lawrence
further testified that "'the purple color of her face,' the 'absence of
79. See id. (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011)).
80. See People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442,445 (Cal. 2012).
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any natural disease that can cause death,' and the fact that Pina had
bitten her tongue shortly before death" indicated strangulation as the
cause of death. Lawrence finally opined that "Pina was strangled 'for
more than two minutes,"' based on her hyoid bone remaining intact.
According to Lawrence, had a fracture occurred, "death could have
occurred sooner."81
Dungo testified that on the night he killed Pina, he told her that
he was suspicious that she had resumed her relationship with another
man named Isaac Zuniga. Pina and Dungo argued, and engaged in
the back and forth dialogue described above. Dungo's testimony
supported the defense theory that he acted in a sudden quarrel or in
the heat of passion-and without the element of malice aforethought
which is required for murder. To counter the defense theory, the
prosecutor relied on Lawrence's testimony. Specifically, the
prosecutor emphasized how Lawrence concluded that Pina was
strangled for over two minutes, thus implying that Dungo could not
have acted in the heat of passion for that length of time.
The jury convicted Dungo of second-degree murder. The court
of appeal reversed the judgment, concluding that Lawrence's
testimony violated Dungo's Sixth Amendment right to confront
Bolduc. 82 The California Supreme Court granted review.
As in Lopez, the California Supreme Court reviewed the same
three U.S. Supreme Court cases applying Crawford to documents
reporting laboratory findings of non-testifying analysts. The court
focused on two critical components it believed were found in
testimonial out-of-court statements: (1) whether the statement was
made with some degree of formality or solemnity, and (2) whether
the statement's primary purpose pertained, in some fashion, to
criminal prosecution. The court recognized that the Supreme Court
justices have not agreed on what the statement's primary purpose
must be.
The California Supreme Court narrowed its analysis to the
admission of Lawrence's description of Pina's body at the time of the
autopsy.Y This description was based on his review of Bolduc's
autopsy report and the accompanying photographs. The court
evaluated whether these portions of Lawrence's testimony should
entitle Dungo to confront Bolduc.
81. Id. at 446.
82. Id. at 447.
83. See id. at 535.
84. See id. at 534-35.
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As in Lopez, the court focused most on the formality evaluation
articulated in the United States Supreme Court cases. The
California Supreme Court found that Bolduc's observations of Pina's
body's condition were objective facts and less formal than statements
setting forth the pathologist's expert conclusions. The court saw that
Bolduc's statements were comparable to a physician's observations of
a report by another physician who diagnosed a particular injury or
ailment to determine the appropriate treatment based on the prior
diagnosis. The court did not find such observations testimonial in
nature.
M. Criticism of California's Requirement of Formality
As seen by the majority opinions in Lopez and Dungo, the
California Supreme Court appears to have decided to evaluate two
factors in its consideration of whether statements contained in
forensic reports are testimonial hearsay." First, the court requires
that the statement be made with formality. Second, the court
considers whether the statement's primary purpose pertained to
criminal prosecution. The court confines its analysis to a search for
these two factors, as if they are requisite elements for a statement to
qualify as testimonial.
Of the two factors, the California Supreme Court
overemphasized the importance of formality. The court in Lopez
went so far as to terminate its analysis once it found that the report at
issue was not sufficiently formal.8 Practically speaking, the majority
in Lopez would likely have been satisfied if mere labels of
"certificate" or "attested" accompanied the analyst's notations.
The decision to rigidly focus on the formality factor does not
appear to have come from U.S. Supreme Court precedent; it has
never relied exclusively on a statement's lack of formality to conclude
that it was not testimonial hearsay.' Crawford and its progeny have
never limited its Confrontation Clause analysis to the level of
formality of a statement.89 The Court has no precedent basing its
entire focus on a statement's formality to determine whether it is
85. See id. at 535-36.
86. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 477-78 (Cal. 2012); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d
442, 449 (Cal. 2012).
87. See Lopez, 286 P.3d at 479.
88. See id. at 483 (Liu, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 591.
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testimonial.0  Indeed, the Court has never determined that a
statement's lack of formality alone would render it non-testimonial."
And certainly, the Court has never terminated its analysis after only
considering the formality of a particular statement.
In Bullcoming, the report at issue was unsworn." However, the
Court recognized that "'the absence of [an] oath [i]s not dispositive'
in determining if a statement is testimonial." 93 The Court recalled
that in Crawford, it had rejected any construction of the
Confrontation Clause that would render inadmissible only sworn ex
parte affidavits, while leaving admission of formal, but unsworn
statements "perfectly OK." Reading the Clause in this manner would
make the right to confrontation "easily erasable."94 The Court further
stated that the absence of notarization does not remove the analyst's
certification from Confrontation Clause governance.
Notations of formality will not effectively cure unreliability in a
forensic report. Analysts may make mistakes in gathering data or in
performing the tests. An analyst must use independent judgment and
skill in a variety of forensic tests.96 Some methodology requires
exercising judgment and presents risks of error that cannot be cured
simply by adding the words "certified" or "sworn." Such labels will
not guarantee honesty, proficiency, or methodology. Adding mere
labels such as "Certification" or "Attestation" do not make a
statement formal to the level of sufficiently ensuring reliability.
Lab analysts remain human beings and are subject to aggressive
or unscrupulous law enforcement officers who pressure them to
change their procedures or results to conform to their investigations.9
Scientific tests are not immune from manipulation.98 Many labs are
affiliated with police departments, and analysts may face pressure to
skew interpretations and to alter results so that they favor police
90. See id. at 594.
91. See id.
92. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2716-17.
96. See Tara R. Price, "Bull" Coming from the States: Why the Supreme Court Should
Use Williams v. Illinois to Close One of Bullcoming's Confrontation Clause Loopholes, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 541 (2012).
97. See Justin Chou, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Raising the Confrontation
Requirements for Forensic Evidence in California, 14 BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. L. 439, 449-
50 (2009).
98. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).
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investigation." They may even cut corners and sacrifice adhering to
precise methodology in order to expedite the testing. In sum, a wide
variety of forensic science is subject to errors. The National Research
Council of the National Academies has documented problems of
"subjectivity, bias, and unreliability of common forensic tests such as
latent fingerprint analysis, pattern/impression analysis, and toolmark
and firearms analysis."'"
Jurors consider scientific test results to have significant
credibility.10' However, scientific tests are not inherently neutral.102
Not only may scientists improperly perform the tests, but sometimes
the tests rely upon outdated science. For example, in 2004, the
National Academy of Sciences found that the FBI's comparative
bullet lead analysis was unreliable, despite its widely accepted use for
decades.os Similarly, the National Academy released a report
criticizing many laboratories for their analyses of fingerprinting,
firearms identification, bite marks, blood spatter, hair, and
handwriting.'" Faulty or discredited forensic science has caused a
large proportion of false convictions."os The National Academy of
Sciences consequently proclaimed that a "national commitment to
overhaul" the forensic science system is necessary.1' The National
Academy of Sciences' findings support the danger in accepting the
analyses of laboratories at face value. No mere formalized stamp of
approval will prevent deficiencies and unreliability in forensic
examination procedures themselves, or make any laboratory
technician infallible.
In Melendez-Diaz, the affidavits demonstrated that the mere
label of "affidavit" failed to ensure proper and reliable testing.
99. See id. at 318-19.
100. See id. at 320-21 (citing NAT'L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 138-
39, 142-43, 154-55 (2009)).
101. See Price, supra note 96, at 542 (citing NAT'L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 48-49 (2009)).
102. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318.
103. See Price, supra note 96, at 540 (citing John Solomon, FBIs Forensic Test Full of
Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at Al).
104. See id. at 540-541 (citation omitted).
105. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319 (citing Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 491 (2006)).
106. See Jesse J. Norris, Who Can Testify About Lab Results after Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming?: Surrogate Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375,
410-11, 421 (2011) (citation omitted).
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Specifically, the affidavits did not contain information about "what
tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and
whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment
or use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.""' The
Court rejected any suggestion that the testing was neutral and
minimized the need for confronting the analyst that performed the
tests in question" The Court even acknowledged the existence of
more effective ways to challenge the results of forensic tests.
However, the Court declared that confrontation of the analyst was
the absolute method guaranteed by the Constitution.
Problems of unreliability cannot be easily cured by allowing the
defense to subpoena the analysts who wrote the certificates. First and
foremost, this proposition improperly shifts the burden of the
prosecution's duty to the defense." Second, the advantages of cross-
examination, over direct examination, include spontaneous testimony
that would yield honest answers. Cross-examination of an analyst
may encourage them to tell the truth on the witness stand."o Even if
cross-examination of an analyst proved ineffectual in a particular
case, the prospect of confrontation would help deter improper
practices by analysts in the first place."'
Moreover, as Justice Kagan warned, focusing on the ultimate
format of a lab report "grants constitutional significance to minutia,
in a way that can only undermine the Confrontation Clause's
protections."" 2  Prosecutors and police agencies could avoid the
demands of the Confrontation Clause by using certain kinds of forms
with certain language, or by never labeling anything a certificate.
This is precisely why it is much more meaningful to examine the
process from which the statements were generated. The absence of
such labels reveals nothing about whether the statements were
generated in a formal manner to suggest that they were testimonial."'
In the end, defendants must be afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine analysts to find errors or falsification.
107. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320.
108. See id. at 318.
109. See id. at 324-25.
110. See id. at 319.
111. See id.
112. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2276 (2012).
113. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 488 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
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A. Primary Purpose: The More Revealing Factor
Crawford jurisprudence actually indicates that the proper
determination for whether a statement is testimonial depends more
on the nature and purpose of the process that generated the
statement than on the statement's format."4 Crawford itself explained
that the original concern behind the Confrontation Clause was "the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused."".. Specifically, it
served to guard against ex parte examinations by the government
outside of the defendant's presence. The determination of what
constitutes such an ex parte examination would focus on the process
through which a statement was generated, not the statement's mere
format or appearance. One of the testimonial hearsay definitions
discussed in Crawford encompasses this concept's consideration of
whether the statement was made under circumstances that would lead
an objective witness to reasonably believe that it would be available
for use at a later trial. Subsequent to Crawford, the Supreme Court
continued to evaluate the context in which the statement was made
and the purpose for which it was produced.
Lower courts presently engage in a two-part analysis when
deciding if a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause
purposes."' First, the recipient of the statement must be a state actor,
and the Court described the state actors to those who perform an
"investigative and prosecutorial function." This requirement
provides protection from state actors who manipulate evidence, as
well as the abuses of inquisitorial style prosecutions."' The focus on
governmental involvement in the production of evidence prevents
prosecutorial abuse."9 The Court in Crawford was concerned with
statements made by the accused to government officials; it is these
statements to government officials that "bear testimony" in the
manner against which the Confrontation Clause was designed to
protect. This protection serves as the entire reason behind the
114. See id. at 486.
115. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
116. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct.
1143, 1160 (2011).
117. See Keenan, supra note 17, at 828.
118. See id. at 830.
119. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 486 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (citing
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004)).
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Confrontation Clause, and consideration of a statement's purpose
falls squarely within this context.
Second, lower courts evaluate the circumstances surrounding the
statement.120 Crawford's three definitions of testimonial-and the
added fourth definition from Davis v. Washington-serve as
illustrations or examples rather than rigid instructions by the Court.
Evaluations by courts should be primarily guided by the concern of
preventing the government from using statements obtained through a
"civil law mode of interrogation."21  The courts should consider
whether the circumstances resemble situations where declarants are
questioned unilaterally by government agents about matters that will
be at issue in later prosecutions.
In a series of Confrontation Clause cases decided after Crawford,
the U.S. Supreme Court has focused on the primary purpose for
which a statement was made. This is the fourth definition of
testimonial, as articulated in Davis v. Washington.22 In Davis, and its
companion case of Hammon v. Indiana, the Court addressed the
particular application of the primary purpose evaluation of
statements made in response to an ongoing emergency. Both cases
involved domestic violence incidents; both were decided separately.
In Davis, the victim, Michelle McCottry, did not testify at trial.
The prosecution introduced her 911 call, which included statements
that Adrian Davis physically abused her. The Supreme Court found
this 911 call admissible.123 The Court said that statements in response
to police interrogation "are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate ... that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution."124 The Court contrasted the 911 call with the
interview taken in Crawford. In Crawford, the declarant's responses
in a stationhouse interview were recorded. The Court in Davis did
not evaluate the formality with which the 911 call was
memorialized.' Instead, the Court focused on the caller's frantic
demeanor and her presence in a potentially unsafe environment. The
Court highlighted the urgent situation for the caller and the likely
need to resolve an emergency, rather than reveal what had happened
120. See Keenan, supra note 17, at 830.
121. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
122. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
123. See id. at 819.
124. See id. at 822.
125. See id. at 827.
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in the past. The Court ultimately found that the primary purpose of
eliciting the statements was to facilitate police response to the
emergency-not to provide testimony as a witness. It was this
evaluation of the statement's primary purpose upon which the
Court's decision rested.
In Hammon v. Indiana, the companion case to Davis, police
officers met with Amy Hammon at her home in response to a
domestic disturbance call.'26 The officers separated her from her
husband, Hershel Hammon, and asked her what happened. She
stated that Hammon had beaten her, and signed an affidavit which
attested to her accusation. The victim's statements were not
recorded, sworn, or certified in any formal manner.
The Court found that the statements and affidavit were
inadmissible.1' It placed little emphasis on the lack of formality of
the circumstances around taking the statement. The Court noted that
the victim answered the police officer's questions for purposes of his
investigation. The questioning took place in a room where the victim
was separated from the suspect. With Amy Hammon's statements,
the Court saw a "striking resemblance" to the statement described in
Crawford as the civil law ex parte examinations. The Court
emphasized that the police deliberately separated both declarants
from the suspect during the interviews. Both statements described
how the past events began and progressed. Both statements were
taken at a time after the events had concluded. The Court declared
that these statements were a clear substitute for live testimony. Thus,
the Court's decisions demonstrated its focus on the process by which
an out-of-court statement was created, and not on its formal
appearance.
As seen with its review of two different statements in the same
decision, the Court in Davis dispelled any suggestion that prior cases,
including Crawford, may have emphasized formality.'" The Court
stated that formality is not dispositive in determining whether a
statement is testimonial. The Court reiterated that statements
violating the Confrontation Clause should not be limited to prior
formal court testimony and depositions. According to the Court, a
note-taking police officer reciting unsworn hearsay is as testimonial as
the admission of a deposition signed by a declarant.129 The California
126. See id. at 819-20.
127. See id. at 834.
128. See Keenan, supra note 17, at 800.
129. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-26 (2006).
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Supreme Court would have reached a different decision regarding the
testimonial character of the statements at issue in Dungo and Lopez,
if it had minimized the significance of formality as a determinative
factor.
B. Bryant: Formality is Not the Sole Touchstone of Testimonial
Hearsay
The U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bryant considered the
scope of Davis' primary purpose test.'" In Bryant, the prosecution
introduced the testimony of police officers who had questioned the
decedent immediately prior to his death. When asked who had shot
him, the victim responded that Rick had shot him. The Court found
the statement to be non-testimonial, reasoning that the primary
purpose of the statement was to assist the police in response to an
ongoing emergency.
According to the Court, this ongoing emergency centered on the
officers and the general public, rather than on the victim himself.'
At the time they obtained the statements, the police had limited
knowledge of the incident.132 They did not know how, why, where, or
when the shooting had occurred. They did not know the location of
the shooter, or anything else about the circumstances surrounding the
crime. By contrast, officers who already have knowledge about an
incident, and believe that it involved criminal activity, are more likely
to obtain statements for prosecutorial use.
Although it expanded the ongoing emergency reasoning from
Davis, Bryant did not provide a new definition of a testimonial
statement. The Supreme Court applied the same consideration of the
statement's primary purpose as in Davis."'3 The Court instructed
lower courts to objectively determine the primary purpose of the
questioning, considering all of the .surrounding circumstances,
including the characteristics of the declarant and the questioner.34
In Bryant, the Court continued to de-emphasize formality as
dispositive for the determination of whether a statement is
testimonial.' Although formality was a factor to be considered, it
130. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
131. See id. at 1166-67.
132. See id. at 1165.
133. See id. at 1154.
134. See id. at 1150.
135. See id. at 1160.
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was not a decisive factor."' The formality in an encounter between a
witness and a police officer may inform the primary purpose of the
interview.' As in Davis, the statement in Bryant was not recorded or
memorialized in any formal manner. The Court also noticed the
other informal circumstances surrounding the statement. Specifically,
the questioning occurred in a disorganized manner, and in an
exposed, public area before the arrival of an ambulance.138 However,
none of these factors precluded the Court from finding that the
statement was testimonial. The Court stated, "although formality
suggests the absence of an emergency and therefore an increased
likelihood that the purpose of the interrogation is to 'establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,'
informality does not necessarily indicate the presence of an
emergency or the lack of testimonial intent.""9 Bryant, then, is
additional Supreme Court precedent that the California Supreme
Court-as well as the Williams plurality-ignored, all while
overemphasizing a statement's formality in Confrontation Clause
analysis.
C. California's Lack of Emphasis on Formality in Cage and Geier
Prior to Lopez and Dungo, the California Supreme Court had
not emphasized a statement's formality as a primary factor in
Confrontation Clause analysis. In 2007, the court in People v. Cage
reviewed an unsworn statement by an assault victim in a hospital
emergency room.140 The declarant's words were not audio recorded
or memorialized in an affidavit or sworn statement. The declarant
was asked a single question. This question called for, and elicited, "a
considered and detailed narrative response."14' The court found the
circumstances no less formal or structured than the residential
interview of the declarant in Davis.142 The court considered the mere
potential criminal consequence of lying to a police officer as
formalizing the statement. All of the other circumstances negated the
formality of the statement. Despite these detracting circumstances,
the court found the statement testimonial.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1166.
138. See id. at 1158.
139. See id. at 1160.
140. See People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205,218-19 (Cal. 2007).
141. See id. at 218 n.16.
142. See id. at 218.
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Prior to Melendez-Diaz, the California courts relied on the 2007
case of People v. Geier in reviewing whether the admission of
statements contained in forensic reports violated the Confrontation
Clause.143 In Geier, the California Supreme Court reviewed a DNA
report that implicated the defendant as the perpetrator of a sexual
assault. The original analyst of the DNA testing did not testify at
trial. Instead, the supervisor of the original analyst testified as a
surrogate witness. The prosecution introduced the contents of the
original analyst's report and the supervisor was permitted to rely on it
as an expert witness.
The court in Geier relied mostly on the opinions of various state
courts, but also considered the decisions of Crawford and Davis.'"
The court formulated a three part test, declaring: "a statement is
testimonial if (1) it is made by a law enforcement officer or by or to a
law enforcement agent and (2) describes a past fact related to
criminal activity for (3) possible use at a later trial." 145 The court in
Geier held that a statement is non-testimonial if it does not meet all
three criteria.
The DNA report in Geier satisfied the first prong because it was
requested by a law enforcement agency.146 The report also satisfied
the third prong because it was prepared for a criminal trial.147
However, the court did not believe that the report satisfied the
second prong.'48 According to the court, a statement's possible use at
a later trial is an important-but not the sole-consideration. The
court found that the report did not describe a past fact related to
criminal activity. Instead, it appeared to contemporaneously describe
a fact because the analyst prepared it as she performed the tests.49
The court said that the report thus resembled a 911 call in which the
declarant relayed present events.' The court held that the report
143. See People v. Geier, 61 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007).
144. See id. at 134-40 (citing State v. Caufield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006);
People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610, 619 (Mich. 2005); Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203,
208 (Nev. 2005); State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 398-399 (Ohio 2005); State v. Miller, 144
P.3d 1052, 1058 (Or. 2006)).
145. See id. at 139-40.
146. See id. at 139.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 139-40.
150. See id. at 139.
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was non-testimonial hearsay, and did not violate the Confrontation
Clause."'
It appears that Geier will not survive much longer in the wake of
Melendez-Diaz.52  In Lopez, the California Supreme Court
commented that under Geier, it would have treated Pefia's report as
non-testimonial for Crawford purposes. However, the Court in
Lopez acknowledged that Melendez-Diaz determined a laboratory
report "may be testimonial, and thus inadmissible, even if it 'contains
near-contemporaneous observations of [a scientific] test.""" This
acknowledgement suggests that Melendez Diaz undermines the
reasoning and holding of Geier.
The key takeaway from Geier is that the California Supreme
Court did not rely on the statement's formality to determine whether
it was testimonial. The report at issue in Geier lacked any sort of
formality. It was not sworn before a notary. The only manner in
which the original analyst's finding was made formal was when the
surrogate witness testified about them under oath.15 4
IV. A Call for Guidance
A. The Plurality's Errors
The U.S. Supreme Court's failure in Williams to provide helpful
guidance is partly to blame for the California Supreme Court's
decisions in Dungo and Lopez. If the Court in Williams adhered to
its prior precedent, other courts such as the California Supreme Court
may not have approached the admissibility of statements contained in
forensic reports with such an unbalanced consideration of their
formality. The court in Dungo practically threw up its arms and
expressed frustration over the "widely divergent views" in Williams
which "highlight the complexity of the issue" of how to determine
whether a statement is testimonial.155
But, buried within Williams is the appropriate guideline for
evaluating forensic reports in the context of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence: In determining the admissibility of statements
contained within forensic reports, Justices Kagan, Scalia, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor agreed that the question for courts to ask is: "whether
151. See id. at 140.
152. For an analysis of Geier after Melendez-Diaz, see Chou, supra note 97, at 463-67.
153. People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 477 (Cal. 2012).
154. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 139 (Cal. 2007).
155. See People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442,448 (Cal. 2012).
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a statement was made for the primary purpose of establishing 'past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution'-in other
words, for the purpose of providing evidence.""' Davis, Bullcoming,
Bryant, Melendez-Diaz, and Crawford have all considered this same
question."' In Justice Kagan's words, these "precedent[s] cannot
sensibly be read any other way."' 8 Even Justice Thomas agreed that
"for a statement to be testimonial within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause, the declarant must primarily intend to
establish some fact with the understanding that his statement may be
used in a criminal prosecution.""'
Melendez-Diaz suggests that the key is the objective purpose of
the statements.'60 This "evidentiary primary purpose test"
contemplates exactly what the Framers had in mind with the
protection of the Sixth Amendment: statements by witnesses against
the accused."' In Melendez-Diaz, the laboratory certificates at issue
were considered testimonial statements because they had a clear
"evidentiary purpose."' 62 They really only served for use in trial. The
Court used the original Crawford language to find that the statements
were "made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that they would be available for use at a
later trial."163
Similarly, the Court in Bullcoming found that the forensic report
at issue was designed to prove some fact in a subsequent criminal
proceeding." As discussed supra, the report indicated the
defendant's blood alcohol content. Additionally, the prosecution at
trial introduced the report through the testimony of a person who
worked at the laboratory but had neither observed the blood test, nor
156. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2273-74 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
157. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155-56, 1160 (2011);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
158. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2268 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11.
161. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 490 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (citing
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,
2717 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52
(2004).
162. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
163. Id.
164. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714-15.
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certified its results. In finding that the results were "made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact," the Court was
evaluating the statement's "primary purpose."'6  The Court in
Bullcoming found the report to be testimonial because it was created
solely for an "evidentiary purpose ... made in aid of a police
investigation." "
Yet Justice Alito departs from the guidelines of Crawford and its
progeny and amends the primary purpose consideration by requiring
that the statement be made with "the primary purpose of accusing a
targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct."16 The statement
at issue involved the DNA comparison results of the defendant and
the sample taken from the victim. According to Justice Alito, the
DNA comparison was prepared before any suspect was identified and
its contents were not prepared for the purpose of targeting the
defendant or any specific person engaged in criminal conduct.'6
Five other justices rejected Justice Alito's rationale.'69 His test
does not derive from the text or history of the Confrontation Clause.
None of the prior cases have suggested that the statement must
accuse a previously identified suspect. It would be unrealistic to say
the purpose of a DNA report is to "catch a dangerous rapist who was
still at large," as if to address an ongoing emergency."o The surrogate
witness, Lambatos, testified that all the reports were prepared for
criminal investigation and for the purpose of eventual litigation. The
police did not send the samples to Cellmark until nine months after
the rape. The results were received four months after the samples
were sent. The timing of the statements establishes that they did not
address an ongoing emergency.
Justice Alito also incorrectly suggested that testimony about the
source of DNA samples and the laboratory's methodology was not
testimonial because it was not offered for its truth.'7' Justice Alito
reasoned that these out-of-court statements were offered merely to
165. See id. at 2717.
166. Id.
167. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (2012) (Alito, J., plurality) (emphasis
added).
168. See id. at 2243.
169. See id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 2228 (Alito, J., plurality).
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explain the assumptions upon which the prosecution expert witness
based his opinion.17 2
The four dissenting justices-and even Justice Thomas in his
concurrence-rejected this argument."' The report upon which an
expert relies does not exist in a vacuum."1 4 The report is prepared for
a specific criminal trial for a specific defendant. The report contains
statements which will be used to prove an essential part of a crime.
Essentially, the expert would testify, "I conclude that the defendant is
the perpetrator because a reliable lab says the perpetrator has a
particular DNA profile, and the defendant has the identical DNA
profile." The statement has no purpose separate from its truth; its
utility is dependent on its truth.' 5 If the statement is true, then the
conclusion based on it is true. If the statement is false, then the
conclusion will necessarily be false. It is not as if the report must be
activated by other evidence. Accordingly, one critic suggests, "when
an expert's basis evidence is testimonial, cross-examining the expert
cannot be deemed a constitutionally adequate substitute under
Crawford for being able to confront whoever actually issued the
testimonial statements.""' The prosecution may not ignore the
constitutional right of confrontation by introducing impermissible
evidence through the guise of an expert's basis evidence.
The Court in Melendez-Diaz saw through the attempt to
introduce the forensic report by the overly simplistic characterization
that it was innocuous by itself, and that it did not accuse the
defendant of wrongdoing."' The Court saw the report's testimonial
character as it clearly showed that the substance at issue contained
illegal narcotics, which, of course, supports a finding of guilty for the
narcotics-related offense.'79  How do the jurors evaluate the drug
analysis through the expert witness? The trial court should have
permitted the jurors to assess the truth of the basis evidence, but
172. See id. at 2242-44.
173. See id. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring).
174. See Chou, supra note 97, at 460.
175. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2268 (Thomas, J., concurring).
176. See Norris, supra note 106, at 408-409 (citing Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause after Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 791,
834 (2007)).
177. See Chou, supra note 97, at 460-61.
178. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313 (2009).
179. See id.
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could not because the author of the basis evidence avoided
confrontation.
In California, the criminal jury instruction on expert witnesses
clearly guides jurors to determine whether the information on which
experts rely is true and accurate." This instruction directs jurors to
separate the reports or other basis evidence from the expert's live
testimony. The weight given to the expert is dependent on the
substance of the underlying information. Even if the prosecution
introduced the analysis in the forensic report through an expert's
opinion, it should still be independently presented to the jury."
This practice makes sense because outside experts-unfamiliar
with the procedures and customs of the particular lab-are unlikely to
detect errors or provide information about whether the correct
methodology was applied because they do not have direct knowledge
of the actual performance of the examination that produced the
result.182 Otherwise, experts would only presume the validity of the
test results based on faith. Consequently, unsophisticated jurors
would similarly presume validity of a report without a presentation by
the original analyst. Unless the reports are separately presented, the
information would go untested by cross-examination.
Even if the surrogate witness who testified in lieu of the original
analyst is an analyst from the same lab as the original analyst, his
testimony would not satisfy the confrontation requirement."' On the
extreme end, the surrogate witness would not have any way of
knowing if the original analyst fraudulently altered test results. Even
if the original analyst was honest and possessed good intentions, there
is no guarantee that she was competent and infallible." The concern
with laboratory witnesses typically may not involve personal agendas
against suspects, but rather, issues of carelessness. A significant
danger exists with the surrogate witness basing his decision on
erroneous work by the original analyst."' It would be impossible to
uncover any error because the surrogate would be testifying to
180. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 332 (2013)
(stating, "You must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and
accurate."); see also Chou, supra note 97, at 460-61.
181. After Lopez and Dungo, at least one court of appeals characterizes such basis
evidence as being introduced for its truth. See People v. Westmoreland, 213 Cal. App. 4th
602, 623-24 (2013).
182. See Norris, supra note 106, at 412.
183. See id..at 400.
184. See Price, supra note 96, at 559.
185. See id.
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something he did not personally observe.1' For example, in
Bullcoming, the original analyst certified in the report that the sample
was sealed until opened in the lab, that his statements were correct,
that he had followed all procedures, and that no circumstance
affected the validity of the analysis." The Supreme Court stated that
the original analyst did more than act as a "mere scrivener."'8 A
surrogate cannot testify about the original analyst's knowledge of the
events that his certification concerned, or expose any lapses in
judgment or lies by the original analyst. 89
Even if the surrogate were the director of the laboratory-and
familiar with the laboratory's standard procedures and analysts-
cross-examination of anyone other than the original analyst would
not satisfy the right to confrontation." Lab supervisors who act as
surrogates have incentives to come to the same conclusion as the
original analyst.'9' When crime labs are funded and administered by a
police agency, supervisors may be influenced by bias or fear of
disfavor, and may be unwilling to depart from the original result when
it is incriminating. More importantly, a supervisor's dispute with the
analyst's work may necessitate an investigation of the entire lab's
competence. Numerous convictions may be reversed based on the
loss of the lab's integrity. A supervisor who trained the original
analyst may be disinclined to admit errors in the analyst's work
because it would reflect negatively on her training. Moreover,
because of the personal relationship the supervisor may have with the
analyst, he may be less likely to apply a stringent standard to his
analysis. Based on the multiple repercussions of a supervisor
disputing the original analyst's work, it is unlikely that he would ever
arrive at a different conclusion.
Even if the laboratory supervisor were proficient in analysis, his
surrogate testimony for the original analyst would fail to provide
information needed to determine the accuracy of the test results.
Typically, the supervisor merely reviews and approves the testing
analyst's report.' In some cases, the supervisor may even only
186. See id.
187. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2011).
188. See id.
189. See Norris, supra note 106, at 387.
190. See id. at 401.
191. See id. at 419-20.
192. See id. at 400-01.
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rubber stamp the results.'9  Melendez-Diaz only allowed for the
original analyst to satisfy the confrontation requirement. 94 The only
time a supervisor could serve as a legitimate surrogate would be when
he actually observed the entire test and would consequently be able
to verify all of the analyst's representations.
Additionally, in those cases when a prosecutor deliberately
chooses not to call the original analyst because of a problem with her
qualifications, the surrogate would not be in the position to reveal
such problems. Take the history of the pathologist in Dungo: Dr.
Bolduc specifically had been fired from the agency that performed
the autopsy in the case; he was forced to resign from another agency;
he falsified his resume; and he faced accusations of incompetence. 95
Often, prosecutors will seek to use surrogate witnesses to avoid
calling witnesses with tarnished records. 96 Courts should not allow
prosecutors to call a substitute witness and deprive jurors from
considering the original analyst's credibility. How is it fair for a
prosecutor to conceal the truth about the original analyst by calling a
surrogate witness who may claim ignorance about his predecessor's
deficiencies?"
B. The Errors of Lopez and Dungo
If Williams more clearly directed courts to evaluate statements
for Confrontation Clause purposes, would Lopez and Dungo have
resulted differently? The California Supreme Court lamented that
the U.S. Supreme Court "has not agreed on a definition of
'testimonial.""98 Without proper guidance from the United States
Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court focused primarily on
the consideration of whether a statement was made with formality or
solemnity. Implementing the formality consideration into the
Confrontation Clause evaluation, the Court in Lopez swiftly
dismissed the blood alcohol report as non-testimonial because it was
not made with formality or solemnity. Similarly, the Court in Dungo
did not see the autopsy report at issue as containing statements made
with formality because it merely recorded objective facts, rather than
193. See id. at 419-20.
194. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009); Norris, supra note
106, at 400.
195. See People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 445 (Cal. 2012).
196. See Norris, supra note 106, at 396-97.
197. See id. at 404.
19& See People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 448 (Cal. 2012).
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expert conclusions. As discussed above,'" the focus on formality does
not perfectly reflect the sort of statement that should trigger
Confrontation Clause concern.
Even with these curious descriptions of the forensic reports at
issue in Dungo and Lopez, the reports in both cases contain
statements that have the primary purpose of being used for criminal
prosecution. First, the Court in Dungo could not deny that the
autopsy reports were prepared primarily for criminal prosecution (as
is the case for all autopsy reports). It suggested other possible uses of
autopsy reports, including use by a family deciding to file a wrongful
death action or by an insurance company to determine if the death is
covered by the terms of a policy. In California, the law regulates
autopsies and the preparation of autopsy reports.2 " While there may
be multiple uses for an autopsy report after its completion, the
primary purpose of an autopsy report is to determine whether a
homicide occurred. That is, whether foul play occurred in the death
of a human being. The later and ultimate decision to file a criminal
case involving the death is immaterial to the original purpose of the
autopsy.
The Court also conceded that several additional facts support the
particular autopsy report was prepared for the purpose of criminal
prosecution.2 01 First, a detective was present when Bolduc, the
pathologist, performed the autopsy. Second, the law required that
Bolduc notify the police if he determined that there were reasonable
grounds to suspect the death was a homicide. This particular
instruction to the pathologist suggests that the autopsy's purpose is
closely intertwined with a police investigation. Third, the case
detective disclosed Dungo's confession to Bolduc before he wrote the
autopsy report. This disclosure suggests no other purpose than to
influence Bolduc with his findings in favor of the criminal prosecution
of Dungo. Each of these facts shows that the autopsy and its report
are specifically connected to the police investigation and ultimate
criminal prosecution of Dungo.
Similarly, in Lopez, the primary purpose of the blood alcohol
analysis was undoubtedly for criminal prosecution. Pefia, the non-
testifying analyst, was an employee of the San Diego County Sheriff's
Regional Crime Laboratory, a state-licensed forensic alcohol
199. See supra Section III.
200. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 27491 (2012) (requiring coroner to "inquire into and
determine the circumstances, manner, and cause" of death).
201. See Dungo, 286 P.3d at 449-50.
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laboratory under the control of the San Diego Sheriff's
Department.2 " This government laboratory received Hernandez
Lopez's blood sample from the California Highway Patrol, the state's
primary law enforcement agency. The specific log sheet was
produced purely with as much governmental involvement as the
recorded interview at the police station at issue in Crawford.203 The
government's involvement is apparent from the licensing
requirements of the crime laboratory by California's Department of
Public Health, the analyst's qualifications, the testing methodology,
and the record keeping.204 Errors in the log sheet can be compared to
mistaken statements or lies made to police officers. There are
sanctions for errors by analysts just as there are sanctions for perjury
by witnesses.
The majority in Lopez narrowed its decision to consider a single
page of the report because the remaining pages (two through six)
were machine printouts deemed to be non-testimonial. Yet courts
should not automatically dismiss machine printouts as non-
testimonial statements. The term "raw data" as contained on
machine printouts is misleading.205 The generation of raw data is
rarely dependent exclusively on a machine. The data is not self-
automated, and certainly does not produce itself. In fact, humans are
involved in the creation of most forensic data. When using machines
to obtain results, analysts engage in a methodology involving multiple
steps. An analyst must adhere to complex procedures for which he is
required to be extensively trained." Typically, the machine must be
calibrated by the analyst. Precautions must be taken by analysts to
prevent contamination. Until the results are generated, the analyst
would need to monitor the process. At the end of the process, the
analyst would then need to annotate the results onto some document,
and these annotations become a testimonial statement. If the data
presents a particular result from a test, such a result would have to be
construed as some kind of statement. Such results would include
positive results from drug and blood alcohol concentration tests. The
202. See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469,472 (Cal. 2012).
203. See id. at 489 (Liu, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 489.
205. See Norris, supra note 106, at 413.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 423.
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data must be considered the analyst's statement, which is subject to
review for confrontation purposes.2
Arguments have also been made to allow surrogates to testify
when they reach independent conclusions based on the so-called "raw
data," rather than relying exclusively on the original analyst's testing
and conclusions.2 8 In situations where a surrogate witness reviews the
"raw data," and claims to complete her own independent analysis,
such an independent analysis will be superficial and cursory. The
reality is that surrogates may review the original analyst's reasoning
and claim it as their own with minimal effort.2 o Realistically, the so-
called independent analysis will be a matter of "going through the
motions" and merely duplicate the original analyst's conclusion.21'
Any proficient surrogate would be able to reproduce an analyst's
exact conclusion without devoting the independent effort.212
Surrogates can easily duplicate the original analyst's reasoning in
their own words.213 The surrogate witness will only serve as a mere
conduit for the original analyst's testimonial statements.2 14 Any naive
belief that the surrogate's independent analysis can never be a
subterfuge for admitting testimonial hearsay ignores the fact that the
underlying data is completely dependent on the original analyst's
methodology. However, the "independent" analysis remains
dependent on the reliability of the original underlying data, which is
still a testimonial statement.21' As discussed above, the validity of the
underlying data is dependent on the performance and qualifications
of the original analyst. Any time a surrogate depends on analyst-
generated data to reach his independent conclusion, a confrontation
issue exists. It does not make a difference if the surrogate relies on a
number of sources or has significant expertise.216
The problem with the independent analysis of "raw data" is that
any sham would be nearly impossible to discover. One critic of
surrogate testimony states, "If the [expert's] opinion is only as good
as the facts on which it is based, and if those facts consist of
208. See id. at 423-24.
209. See id. at 406.
210. See id. at 407.
211. See id. at 412.
212. See id. at 412-13.
213. See id. at 415.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 424.
216. See id. at 407 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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testimonial hearsay statements that were not subject to cross-
examination, then it is difficult to imagine how the defendant is
expected to demonstrate the underlying information [is] incorrect or
unreliable." 217  This is the same problem encountered with Justice
Alito's reasoning regarding the expert witness in Williams. Simply
asking the surrogate on cross-examination would not force the
surrogate to admit that he did not truly apply his own independent
analysis. The defendant still will be deprived of the opportunity to
challenge the source of those testimonial statements.218 The defense
will be unable to cross-examine the validity of the analyst-produced
data without the presence of the original analyst at trial. Cross-
examining the surrogate would rarely reveal flaws caused by the
original analyst in preparation of the underlying data. 219 Typically,
only the original analyst would know about such flaws. Without the
ability to expose the errors or other problems, the right to
confrontation is violated and convictions of innocent people could
result.220
V. Practicality Concerns
Claims have been made that requiring confrontation in cases
involving forensic lab reports would disrupt forensic investigations
when a particular analyst could not appear at trial.221 In high volume
jurisdictions such as Los Angeles County, prosecutors may inevitably
fail to have the original analyst of a forensic examination testify about
his or her results. Often, the original analyst may not be available for
testimony because she no longer works at the particular laboratory,
or he is testifying at a different trial.
217. Id. at 408 (quoting Julie A. Seaman, Triangular Testimonial Hearsay: The
Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 847 (2008)); see
also Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2256 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
"statements introduced to explain the basis of an expert's opinion are not introduced for a
plausible nonhearsay purpose. There is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an
out-of-court statement so that the factfinder may evaluate the expert's opinion and
disclosing the statement for its truth. 'To use the inadmissible information in evaluating
the expert's testimony, the jury must make a preliminary judgment about whether this
information is true."' (citing D. KAYE, D. BERNSTEIN & J. MNOOKIN, THE NEW
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.10.1, at 196 (2d ed.
2011))).
218. See id. at 379.
219. See id. at 408.
220. See id. at 378.
221. See Nicholas Klaiber, Confronting Reality: Surrogate Forensic Science Witnesses
Under the Confrontation Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 199, 229-35 (2011).
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In the context of forensic testing in criminal prosecutions, when
one of the pertinent witnesses is unavailable, what are a prosecutor's
options? Rather than call a surrogate witness to testify about the
original analyst's testing, the prosecution could simply have the
testing repeated by another analyst who will be available for
testimony.222 While certain forensic analyses cannot be repeated-
such as autopsies or breathalyzer tests-many tests can be repeated.
Such repeated testing allows for the confrontation of an analyst who
actually performed the test. The second test may confirm the original
results. Such a confirmation may even encourage defendants to
stipulate to test results and avoid the need for calling witnesses
altogether. This second test may also reveal problems with the
original results and potentially safeguard against false convictions.
Although the right to confrontation clearly creates
inconvenience, practicality concerns should never limit constitutional
protections.2" To protect the public and establish order in society, it
is important that criminal offenders are prosecuted. Ideally,
offenders should not be freed as a result of convenience or logistical
dilemmas. However, the unique position of the accused guarantees
him specific rights. The right to confrontation, among other
constitutional rights, is sacred and necessary because prosecutions
potentially take away the liberty, and sometimes life, of the accused.
For the system to work properly, these rights must be uniformly
applied to protect those wrongly accused, as well as those facing
overwhelming evidence of guilt. These rights must never be abridged
by concerns of convenience or practicality.
Conclusion
Despite the confusion generated by the plurality opinion in
Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court has never abandoned the original
definitions of testimonial statements set forth in Crawford and then
again in Melendez-Diaz.224  Rather, in Melendez-Diaz, the Court
demonstrated that Davis' primary purpose test did not displace the
222. See Norris, supra note 106, at 419.
223. Despite these concerns, only a small fraction of controlled substance analyses
performed by state and federal laboratories actually proceed to trial. See Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009). In reality, the ten states that held that crime
lab reports were testimonial after Crawford did not actually experience logistical
repercussions. See id. at 326 n. 11 (citing cases from Florida, Colorado, Oregon, Montana,
Washington, D.C., Minnesota, Nevada, Illinois, Georgia, and Mississippi).
224. See Keenan, supra note 17, at 808.
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prior tests. 25 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court appeared to rely on both
the objective witness standard and the primary purpose test.226
However, as a result of the California Supreme Court's reliance on
Williams in Dungo and Lopez, the California Courts of Appeal are
presently struggling with U.S. Supreme Court guidelines.227 In Justice
Goodwin Liu's words, the California Supreme Court's nine separate
opinions of its latest Confrontation Clause cases have created a
"muddled state" of Confrontation Clause doctrine.2 2
Unless and until the federal and state higher courts clarify the
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, enormous responsibility falls on
all parties in a criminal trial. Prosecutors should not prevent
disclosure of the truth by electing to call improper witnesses who lack
the necessary knowledge to testify. The defense must challenge the
introduction of evidence that cannot be fairly tested. Trial courts
must conscientiously consider all circumstances surrounding
contested statements and apply the constitutionally mandated
principles, whether or not they agree with them, and whether or not it
is inconvenient to do So.229 Only when each party fulfills its respective
duty will the criminal trial achieve its goals of justice and fairness.
225. See id. at 804 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009)).
226. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-311 (2009).
227. See People v. Ellis, 213 Cal. App. 4th 1551, 1561 (2013) (acknowledging that
"[e]fforts by both the United States Supreme Court and our own Supreme Court to more
precisely define the contours of the confrontation clause, and to determine what is
testimonial hearsay have proven challenging and problematic, with no clear majority view
in may of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions, and multiple concurring and
dissenting opinions by our own Supreme Court justices). See also People v. Holmes, 212
Cal. App. 4th 431, 438 (2012) (declaring that it is compelled to follow the majority opinion
in Lopez).
228. People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
229. See People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442,469 (Cal. 2012) (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
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